Resistance to Sybil Attacks from Fidelity Bonds
Sybil attacks from external enemies.
Assuming the makers in the offerbook right now are not sybil attackers, how much would a sybil attacker starting now have to sacrifice to succeed in their attack with 95% probability. Honest weight=0.0000047675116781 BTC
1.3Also assumes that takers are not price-sensitive and that their max coinjoin fee is configured high enough that they dont exclude any makers.
Maker count | 6month locked coins / BTC | 1y locked coins / BTC | 2y locked coins / BTC | 5y locked coins / BTC | 10y locked coins / BTC | Required burned coins / BTC |
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1 | 15.31291267 | 7.65645633 | 3.82822817 | 1.53129127 | 0.76564563 | 0.00957057 |
2 | 37.51583282 | 18.75791641 | 9.37895820 | 3.75158328 | 1.87579164 | 0.02344740 |
3 | 62.33372044 | 31.16686022 | 15.58343011 | 6.23337204 | 3.11668602 | 0.03895858 |
4 | 88.68496825 | 44.34248412 | 22.17124206 | 8.86849682 | 4.43424841 | 0.05542811 |
5 | 116.12584654 | 58.06292327 | 29.03146163 | 11.61258465 | 5.80629233 | 0.07257865 |
6 | 144.40702790 | 72.20351395 | 36.10175698 | 14.44070279 | 7.22035140 | 0.09025439 |
7 | 173.36952330 | 86.68476165 | 43.34238082 | 17.33695233 | 8.66847616 | 0.10835595 |
8 | 202.90346401 | 101.45173201 | 50.72586600 | 20.29034640 | 10.14517320 | 0.12681467 |
9 | 232.92856837 | 116.46428418 | 58.23214209 | 23.29285684 | 11.64642842 | 0.14558036 |
10 | 263.38371433 | 131.69185717 | 65.84592858 | 26.33837143 | 13.16918572 | 0.16461482 |
11 | 294.22087654 | 147.11043827 | 73.55521913 | 29.42208765 | 14.71104383 | 0.18388805 |
12 | 325.40136583 | 162.70068291 | 81.35034146 | 32.54013658 | 16.27006829 | 0.20337585 |
13 | 356.89337583 | 178.44668792 | 89.22334396 | 35.68933758 | 17.84466879 | 0.22305836 |
14 | 388.12112504 | 194.06056252 | 97.03028126 | 38.81211250 | 19.40605625 | 0.24257570 |
15 | 420.14607880 | 210.07303940 | 105.03651970 | 42.01460788 | 21.00730394 | 0.26259130 |
16 | 451.40945930 | 225.70472965 | 112.85236483 | 45.14094593 | 22.57047297 | 0.28213091 |
17 | 483.57501746 | 241.78750873 | 120.89375437 | 48.35750175 | 24.17875087 | 0.30223439 |
18 | 515.93520744 | 257.96760372 | 128.98380186 | 51.59352074 | 25.79676037 | 0.32245950 |
19 | 548.47823614 | 274.23911807 | 137.11955903 | 54.84782361 | 27.42391181 | 0.34279890 |
20 | 581.19361411 | 290.59680706 | 145.29840353 | 58.11936141 | 29.05968071 | 0.36324601 |
21 | 614.07195315 | 307.03597658 | 153.51798829 | 61.40719532 | 30.70359766 | 0.38379497 |
22 | 647.10480351 | 323.55240175 | 161.77620088 | 64.71048035 | 32.35524018 | 0.40444050 |
23 | 680.28452146 | 340.14226073 | 170.07113036 | 68.02845215 | 34.01422607 | 0.42517783 |
24 | 713.60416056 | 356.80208028 | 178.40104014 | 71.36041606 | 35.68020803 | 0.44600260 |
25 | 747.05738150 | 373.52869075 | 186.76434537 | 74.70573815 | 37.35286907 | 0.46691086 |
Sybil attacks from enemies within
Assume a sybil attack is ongoing right now and that the counterparties with the most valuable fidelity bonds are actually controlled by the same entity. Then, what is the probability of a successful sybil attack for a given makercount, and what is the fidelity bond value being foregone by not putting all bitcoins into just one maker.
Maker count | Success probability | Foregone value / BTC1.3 |
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1 | 30.62515% | -0.0000000000000000 |
2 | 22.82819% | 0.0000027208139163 |
3 | 37.49883% | 0.0000078220237949 |
4 | 91.87784% | 0.0000139549580677 |
5 | 19.90431% | 0.0000147759818749 |
6 | 9.53948% | 0.0000155985144871 |
7 | 6.34946% | 0.0000163285021938 |
8 | 6.16614% | 0.0000170253356627 |
9 | 7.59108% | 0.0000176660481455 |
10 | 6.43067% | 0.0000181371677678 |