Resistance to Sybil Attacks from Fidelity Bonds
Sybil attacks from external enemies.
Assuming the makers in the offerbook right now are not sybil attackers, how much would a sybil attacker starting now have to sacrifice to succeed in their attack with 95% probability. Honest weight=0.0000117293218600 BTC
1.3Also assumes that takers are not price-sensitive and that their max coinjoin fee is configured high enough that they dont exclude any makers.
Maker count | 6month locked coins / BTC | 1y locked coins / BTC | 2y locked coins / BTC | 5y locked coins / BTC | 10y locked coins / BTC | Required burned coins / BTC |
---|
1 | 24.01863790 | 12.00931895 | 6.00465947 | 2.40186379 | 1.20093189 | 0.01501165 |
2 | 58.84440298 | 29.42220149 | 14.71110074 | 5.88444030 | 2.94222015 | 0.03677775 |
3 | 97.77180165 | 48.88590082 | 24.44295041 | 9.77718016 | 4.88859008 | 0.06110738 |
4 | 139.10430924 | 69.55215462 | 34.77607731 | 13.91043092 | 6.95521546 | 0.08694019 |
5 | 182.14592604 | 91.07296302 | 45.53648151 | 18.21459260 | 9.10729630 | 0.11384120 |
6 | 226.50557657 | 113.25278828 | 56.62639414 | 22.65055766 | 11.32527883 | 0.14156599 |
7 | 271.93388302 | 135.96694151 | 67.98347076 | 27.19338830 | 13.59669415 | 0.16995868 |
8 | 318.25851394 | 159.12925697 | 79.56462849 | 31.82585139 | 15.91292570 | 0.19891157 |
9 | 365.35354576 | 182.67677288 | 91.33838644 | 36.53535458 | 18.26767729 | 0.22834597 |
10 | 413.12310723 | 206.56155362 | 103.28077681 | 41.31231072 | 20.65615536 | 0.25820194 |
11 | 461.49186952 | 230.74593476 | 115.37296738 | 46.14918695 | 23.07459348 | 0.28843242 |
12 | 510.39914783 | 255.19957392 | 127.59978696 | 51.03991478 | 25.51995739 | 0.31899947 |
13 | 559.79505319 | 279.89752660 | 139.94876330 | 55.97950532 | 27.98975266 | 0.34987191 |
14 | 608.77645971 | 304.38822986 | 152.19411493 | 60.87764597 | 30.43882299 | 0.38048529 |
15 | 659.00829900 | 329.50414950 | 164.75207475 | 65.90082990 | 32.95041495 | 0.41188019 |
16 | 708.04559398 | 354.02279699 | 177.01139850 | 70.80455940 | 35.40227970 | 0.44252850 |
17 | 758.49797433 | 379.24898717 | 189.62449358 | 75.84979743 | 37.92489872 | 0.47406123 |
18 | 809.25563893 | 404.62781947 | 202.31390973 | 80.92556389 | 40.46278195 | 0.50578477 |
19 | 860.30009007 | 430.15004503 | 215.07502252 | 86.03000901 | 43.01500450 | 0.53768756 |
20 | 911.61487480 | 455.80743740 | 227.90371870 | 91.16148748 | 45.58074374 | 0.56975930 |
21 | 963.18526752 | 481.59263376 | 240.79631688 | 96.31852675 | 48.15926338 | 0.60199079 |
22 | 1014.99801462 | 507.49900731 | 253.74950365 | 101.49980146 | 50.74990073 | 0.63437376 |
23 | 1067.04112674 | 533.52056337 | 266.76028169 | 106.70411267 | 53.35205634 | 0.66690070 |
24 | 1119.30370825 | 559.65185413 | 279.82592706 | 111.93037083 | 55.96518541 | 0.69956482 |
25 | 1171.77581578 | 585.88790789 | 292.94395394 | 117.17758158 | 58.58879079 | 0.73235988 |
Sybil attacks from enemies within
Assume a sybil attack is ongoing right now and that the counterparties with the most valuable fidelity bonds are actually controlled by the same entity. Then, what is the probability of a successful sybil attack for a given makercount, and what is the fidelity bond value being foregone by not putting all bitcoins into just one maker.
Maker count | Success probability | Foregone value / BTC1.3 |
---|
1 | 45.08186% | 0.0000000000000000 |
2 | 42.78365% | 0.0000085299313785 |
3 | 22.36678% | 0.0000162970349945 |
4 | 20.16127% | 0.0000254046727417 |
5 | 24.34101% | 0.0000345577545674 |
6 | 30.82795% | 0.0000425868992517 |
7 | 65.91438% | 0.0000506354809497 |
8 | 39.47404% | 0.0000536587786979 |
9 | 21.45537% | 0.0000556701597378 |
10 | 15.58679% | 0.0000573934124030 |