Resistance to Sybil Attacks from Fidelity Bonds

Sybil attacks from external enemies.

Assuming the makers in the offerbook right now are not sybil attackers, how much would a sybil attacker starting now have to sacrifice to succeed in their attack with 95% probability. Honest weight=1.8473702457376115 BTC²
Also assumes that takers are not price-sensitive and that their max coinjoin fee is configured high enough that they dont exclude any makers.
Maker count6month locked coins / BTC1y locked coins / BTC2y locked coins / BTC5y locked coins / BTC10y locked coins / BTCRequired burned coins / BTC
19532.106701374766.053350692383.02667534953.21067014476.605335075.95756669
223353.1614242311676.580712125838.290356062335.316142421167.6580712114.59572589
338802.0024177219401.001208869700.500604433880.200241771940.1001208924.25125151
455205.3419533227602.6709766613801.335488335520.534195332760.2670976734.50333872
572286.9635580736143.4817790318071.740889527228.696355813614.3481779045.17935222
689891.6638691044945.8319345522472.915967278989.166386914494.5831934556.18228992
7107920.4740896053960.2370448026980.1185224010792.047408965396.0237044867.45029631
8126305.0022531463152.5011265731576.2505632912630.500225316315.2501126678.94062641
9144995.2739632472497.6369816236248.8184908114499.527396327249.7636981690.62204623
10163953.2414803281976.6207401640988.3103700816395.324148038197.66207402102.47077593
11183149.0095811191574.5047905545787.2523952818314.900958119157.45047906114.46813099
12202558.49472364101279.2473618250639.6236809120255.8494723610127.92473618126.59905920
13222161.89781989111080.9489099555540.4744549722216.1897819911108.09489099138.85118614
14241600.80169763120800.4008488260400.2004244124160.0801697612080.04008488151.00050106
15261535.95596959130767.9779847965383.9889924026153.5955969613076.79779848163.45997248
16280997.03990842140498.5199542170249.2599771128099.7039908414049.85199542175.62314994
17301019.71875022150509.8593751175254.9296875630101.9718750215050.98593751188.13732422
18321163.55359233160581.7767961780290.8883980832116.3553592316058.17767962200.72722100
19341421.20337381170710.6016869085355.3008434534142.1203373817071.06016869213.38825211
20361786.13853515180893.0692675890446.5346337936178.6138535218089.30692676226.11633658
21382252.51503131191126.2575156695563.1287578338225.2515031319112.62575157238.90782189
22402815.07298901201407.53649451100703.7682472540281.5072989020140.75364945251.75942062
23423469.05428476211734.52714238105867.2635711942346.9054284821173.45271424264.66815893
24444210.13484038222105.06742019111052.5337100944421.0134840422210.50674202277.63133428
25465034.36850322232517.18425161116258.5921258046503.4368503223251.71842516290.64648031

Sybil attacks from enemies within

Assume a sybil attack is ongoing right now and that the counterparties with the most valuable fidelity bonds are actually controlled by the same entity. Then, what is the probability of a successful sybil attack for a given makercount, and what is the fidelity bond value being foregone by not putting all bitcoins into just one maker.
Maker countSuccess probabilityForegone value / BTC²
126.95632%0.0000000000000000
219.57636%0.9891665971072716
327.99872%2.8423925739177536
461.40519%5.1735379551672835
535.01774%6.2257413484020558
613.74761%6.8965830996146620
77.26298%7.5145641134185404
83.90056%8.0350285693955783
92.78727%8.5420191315481730
102.12726%8.9987158080088001