Resistance to Sybil Attacks from Fidelity Bonds
Sybil attacks from external enemies.
Assuming the makers in the offerbook right now are not sybil attackers, how much would a sybil attacker starting now have to sacrifice to succeed in their attack with 95% probability. Honest weight=0.0000037669586450 BTC
1.3Also assumes that takers are not price-sensitive and that their max coinjoin fee is configured high enough that they dont exclude any makers.
Maker count | 6month locked coins / BTC | 1y locked coins / BTC | 2y locked coins / BTC | 5y locked coins / BTC | 10y locked coins / BTC | Required burned coins / BTC |
---|
1 | 13.61154268 | 6.80577134 | 3.40288567 | 1.36115427 | 0.68057713 | 0.00850721 |
2 | 33.34756558 | 16.67378279 | 8.33689139 | 3.33475656 | 1.66737828 | 0.02084223 |
3 | 55.40801507 | 27.70400754 | 13.85200377 | 5.54080151 | 2.77040075 | 0.03463001 |
4 | 78.83145787 | 39.41572894 | 19.70786447 | 7.88314579 | 3.94157289 | 0.04926966 |
5 | 103.22346572 | 51.61173286 | 25.80586643 | 10.32234657 | 5.16117329 | 0.06451467 |
6 | 128.36241318 | 64.18120659 | 32.09060330 | 12.83624132 | 6.41812066 | 0.08022651 |
7 | 154.10697599 | 77.05348800 | 38.52674400 | 15.41069760 | 7.70534880 | 0.09631686 |
8 | 180.35949262 | 90.17974631 | 45.08987315 | 18.03594926 | 9.01797463 | 0.11272468 |
9 | 207.04860122 | 103.52430061 | 51.76215031 | 20.70486012 | 10.35243006 | 0.12940538 |
10 | 234.11997086 | 117.05998543 | 58.52999271 | 23.41199709 | 11.70599854 | 0.14632498 |
11 | 261.53091210 | 130.76545605 | 65.38272802 | 26.15309121 | 13.07654560 | 0.16345682 |
12 | 289.24703442 | 144.62351721 | 72.31175860 | 28.92470344 | 14.46235172 | 0.18077940 |
13 | 317.24006536 | 158.62003268 | 79.31001634 | 31.72400654 | 15.86200327 | 0.19827504 |
14 | 344.99819669 | 172.49909834 | 86.24954917 | 34.49981967 | 17.24990983 | 0.21562387 |
15 | 373.46495767 | 186.73247884 | 93.36623942 | 37.34649577 | 18.67324788 | 0.23341560 |
16 | 401.25476142 | 200.62738071 | 100.31369035 | 40.12547614 | 20.06273807 | 0.25078423 |
17 | 429.84650468 | 214.92325234 | 107.46162617 | 42.98465047 | 21.49232523 | 0.26865407 |
18 | 458.61125482 | 229.30562741 | 114.65281370 | 45.86112548 | 22.93056274 | 0.28663203 |
19 | 487.53852904 | 243.76926452 | 121.88463226 | 48.75385290 | 24.37692645 | 0.30471158 |
20 | 516.61900335 | 258.30950168 | 129.15475084 | 51.66190034 | 25.83095017 | 0.32288688 |
21 | 545.84433263 | 272.92216632 | 136.46108316 | 54.58443326 | 27.29221663 | 0.34115271 |
22 | 575.20700595 | 287.60350298 | 143.80175149 | 57.52070060 | 28.76035030 | 0.35950438 |
23 | 604.70022887 | 302.35011444 | 151.17505722 | 60.47002289 | 30.23501144 | 0.37793764 |
24 | 634.31782674 | 317.15891337 | 158.57945668 | 63.43178267 | 31.71589134 | 0.39644864 |
25 | 664.05416458 | 332.02708229 | 166.01354114 | 66.40541646 | 33.20270823 | 0.41503385 |
Sybil attacks from enemies within
Assume a sybil attack is ongoing right now and that the counterparties with the most valuable fidelity bonds are actually controlled by the same entity. Then, what is the probability of a successful sybil attack for a given makercount, and what is the fidelity bond value being foregone by not putting all bitcoins into just one maker.
Maker count | Success probability | Foregone value / BTC1.3 |
---|
1 | 38.70416% | 0.0000000000000000 |
2 | 37.97638% | 0.0000026388322481 |
3 | 23.14957% | 0.0000053754265787 |
4 | 26.58016% | 0.0000087792114943 |
5 | 65.5436% | 0.0000127839502479 |
6 | 71.12224% | 0.0000148080879429 |
7 | 69.76887% | 0.0000159085353612 |
8 | 25.51768% | 0.0000162811647129 |
9 | 16.60778% | 0.0000166262445308 |
10 | 14.35241% | 0.0000169193254299 |