Resistance to Sybil Attacks from Fidelity Bonds
Sybil attacks from external enemies.
Assuming the makers in the offerbook right now are not sybil attackers, how much would a sybil attacker starting now have to sacrifice to succeed in their attack with 95% probability. Honest weight=0.0000029125477911 BTC
1.3Also assumes that takers are not price-sensitive and that their max coinjoin fee is configured high enough that they dont exclude any makers.
Maker count | 6month locked coins / BTC | 1y locked coins / BTC | 2y locked coins / BTC | 5y locked coins / BTC | 10y locked coins / BTC | Required burned coins / BTC |
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1 | 11.96874056 | 5.98437028 | 2.99218514 | 1.19687406 | 0.59843703 | 0.00748046 |
2 | 29.32278656 | 14.66139328 | 7.33069664 | 2.93227866 | 1.46613933 | 0.01832674 |
3 | 48.72071984 | 24.36035992 | 12.18017996 | 4.87207198 | 2.43603599 | 0.03045045 |
4 | 69.31714426 | 34.65857213 | 17.32928606 | 6.93171443 | 3.46585721 | 0.04332322 |
5 | 90.76523582 | 45.38261791 | 22.69130895 | 9.07652358 | 4.53826179 | 0.05672827 |
6 | 112.87011748 | 56.43505874 | 28.21752937 | 11.28701175 | 5.64350587 | 0.07054382 |
7 | 135.50752166 | 67.75376083 | 33.87688042 | 13.55075217 | 6.77537608 | 0.08469220 |
8 | 158.59157378 | 79.29578689 | 39.64789344 | 15.85915738 | 7.92957869 | 0.09911973 |
9 | 182.05952479 | 91.02976239 | 45.51488120 | 18.20595248 | 9.10297624 | 0.11378720 |
10 | 205.86360104 | 102.93180052 | 51.46590026 | 20.58636010 | 10.29318005 | 0.12866475 |
11 | 229.96626537 | 114.98313269 | 57.49156634 | 22.99662654 | 11.49831327 | 0.14372892 |
12 | 254.33727792 | 127.16863896 | 63.58431948 | 25.43372779 | 12.71686390 | 0.15896080 |
13 | 278.95177848 | 139.47588924 | 69.73794462 | 27.89517785 | 13.94758892 | 0.17434486 |
14 | 303.35972989 | 151.67986495 | 75.83993247 | 30.33597299 | 15.16798649 | 0.18959983 |
15 | 328.39078514 | 164.19539257 | 82.09769629 | 32.83907851 | 16.41953926 | 0.20524424 |
16 | 352.82658637 | 176.41329319 | 88.20664659 | 35.28265864 | 17.64132932 | 0.22051662 |
17 | 377.96753956 | 188.98376978 | 94.49188489 | 37.79675396 | 18.89837698 | 0.23622971 |
18 | 403.26061911 | 201.63030955 | 100.81515478 | 40.32606191 | 20.16303096 | 0.25203789 |
19 | 428.69660741 | 214.34830371 | 107.17415185 | 42.86966074 | 21.43483037 | 0.26793538 |
20 | 454.26730580 | 227.13365290 | 113.56682645 | 45.42673058 | 22.71336529 | 0.28391707 |
21 | 479.96537634 | 239.98268817 | 119.99134409 | 47.99653763 | 23.99826882 | 0.29997836 |
22 | 505.78421462 | 252.89210731 | 126.44605366 | 50.57842146 | 25.28921073 | 0.31611513 |
23 | 531.71784623 | 265.85892312 | 132.92946156 | 53.17178462 | 26.58589231 | 0.33232365 |
24 | 557.76084175 | 278.88042087 | 139.44021044 | 55.77608417 | 27.88804209 | 0.34860053 |
25 | 583.90824629 | 291.95412314 | 145.97706157 | 58.39082463 | 29.19541231 | 0.36494265 |
Sybil attacks from enemies within
Assume a sybil attack is ongoing right now and that the counterparties with the most valuable fidelity bonds are actually controlled by the same entity. Then, what is the probability of a successful sybil attack for a given makercount, and what is the fidelity bond value being foregone by not putting all bitcoins into just one maker.
Maker count | Success probability | Foregone value / BTC1.3 |
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1 | 80.60547% | 0.0000000000000000 |
2 | 52.11892% | 0.0000016793087140 |
3 | 45.80887% | 0.0000032392205360 |
4 | 33.86218% | 0.0000043538949764 |
5 | 42.35943% | 0.0000054380843709 |
6 | 40.15736% | 0.0000061557976781 |
7 | 45.69558% | 0.0000067280575201 |
8 | 78.9096% | 0.0000072070616072 |
9 | 50.35286% | 0.0000073601744586 |
10 | 64.70414% | 0.0000074878423862 |