Resistance to Sybil Attacks from Fidelity Bonds
Sybil attacks from external enemies.
Assuming the makers in the offerbook right now are not sybil attackers, how much would a sybil attacker starting now have to sacrifice to succeed in their attack with 95% probability. Honest weight=0.0000001582450540 BTC
1.3Also assumes that takers are not price-sensitive and that their max coinjoin fee is configured high enough that they dont exclude any makers.
Maker count | 6month locked coins / BTC | 1y locked coins / BTC | 2y locked coins / BTC | 5y locked coins / BTC | 10y locked coins / BTC | Required burned coins / BTC |
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1 | 2.78982522 | 1.39491261 | 0.69745630 | 0.27898252 | 0.13949126 | 0.00174364 |
2 | 6.83492544 | 3.41746272 | 1.70873136 | 0.68349254 | 0.34174627 | 0.00427183 |
3 | 11.35644073 | 5.67822036 | 2.83911018 | 1.13564407 | 0.56782204 | 0.00709778 |
4 | 16.15731547 | 8.07865773 | 4.03932887 | 1.61573155 | 0.80786577 | 0.01009832 |
5 | 21.15670754 | 10.57835377 | 5.28917688 | 2.11567075 | 1.05783538 | 0.01322294 |
6 | 26.30919254 | 13.15459627 | 6.57729814 | 2.63091925 | 1.31545963 | 0.01644325 |
7 | 31.58580462 | 15.79290231 | 7.89645116 | 3.15858046 | 1.57929023 | 0.01974113 |
8 | 36.96652705 | 18.48326352 | 9.24163176 | 3.69665270 | 1.84832635 | 0.02310408 |
9 | 42.43673347 | 21.21836673 | 10.60918337 | 4.24367335 | 2.12183667 | 0.02652296 |
10 | 47.98528821 | 23.99264410 | 11.99632205 | 4.79852882 | 2.39926441 | 0.02999081 |
11 | 53.60344163 | 26.80172082 | 13.40086041 | 5.36034416 | 2.68017208 | 0.03350215 |
12 | 59.28414505 | 29.64207252 | 14.82103626 | 5.92841450 | 2.96420725 | 0.03705259 |
13 | 65.02160372 | 32.51080186 | 16.25540093 | 6.50216037 | 3.25108019 | 0.04063850 |
14 | 70.71091731 | 35.35545866 | 17.67772933 | 7.07109173 | 3.53554587 | 0.04419432 |
15 | 76.54547181 | 38.27273591 | 19.13636795 | 7.65454718 | 3.82727359 | 0.04784092 |
16 | 82.24127699 | 41.12063850 | 20.56031925 | 8.22412770 | 4.11206385 | 0.05140080 |
17 | 88.10144789 | 44.05072395 | 22.02536197 | 8.81014479 | 4.40507239 | 0.05506340 |
18 | 93.99707833 | 46.99853916 | 23.49926958 | 9.39970783 | 4.69985392 | 0.05874817 |
19 | 99.92601974 | 49.96300987 | 24.98150494 | 9.99260197 | 4.99630099 | 0.06245376 |
20 | 105.88636108 | 52.94318054 | 26.47159027 | 10.58863611 | 5.29431805 | 0.06617898 |
21 | 111.87639193 | 55.93819597 | 27.96909798 | 11.18763919 | 5.59381960 | 0.06992274 |
22 | 117.89457286 | 58.94728643 | 29.47364321 | 11.78945729 | 5.89472864 | 0.07368411 |
23 | 123.93951125 | 61.96975563 | 30.98487781 | 12.39395113 | 6.19697556 | 0.07746219 |
24 | 130.00994158 | 65.00497079 | 32.50248539 | 13.00099416 | 6.50049708 | 0.08125621 |
25 | 136.10470887 | 68.05235444 | 34.02617722 | 13.61047089 | 6.80523544 | 0.08506544 |
Sybil attacks from enemies within
Assume a sybil attack is ongoing right now and that the counterparties with the most valuable fidelity bonds are actually controlled by the same entity. Then, what is the probability of a successful sybil attack for a given makercount, and what is the fidelity bond value being foregone by not putting all bitcoins into just one maker.
Maker count | Success probability | Foregone value / BTC1.3 |
---|
1 | 56.8419% | 0.0000000000000000 |
2 | 47.69712% | 0.0000001148990555 |
3 | 27.42993% | 0.0000002165074345 |
4 | 26.89562% | 0.0000003296474357 |
5 | 32.18809% | 0.0000004343739075 |
6 | 42.80622% | 0.0000005240623454 |
7 | 29.66148% | 0.0000005760028217 |
8 | 21.70232% | 0.0000006172006560 |
9 | 22.16969% | 0.0000006543361032 |
10 | 29.80528% | 0.0000006867974469 |