Resistance to Sybil Attacks from Fidelity Bonds
Sybil attacks from external enemies.
Assuming the makers in the offerbook right now are not sybil attackers, how much would a sybil attacker starting now have to sacrifice to succeed in their attack with 95% probability. Honest weight=0.0000001665720022 BTC
1.3Also assumes that takers are not price-sensitive and that their max coinjoin fee is configured high enough that they dont exclude any makers.
| Maker count | 6month locked coins / BTC | 1y locked coins / BTC | 2y locked coins / BTC | 5y locked coins / BTC | 10y locked coins / BTC | Required burned coins / BTC |
|---|
| 1 | 2.86228534 | 1.43114267 | 0.71557133 | 0.28622853 | 0.14311427 | 0.00178893 |
| 2 | 7.01244894 | 3.50622447 | 1.75311224 | 0.70124489 | 0.35062245 | 0.00438278 |
| 3 | 11.65140153 | 5.82570077 | 2.91285038 | 1.16514015 | 0.58257008 | 0.00728213 |
| 4 | 16.57696937 | 8.28848469 | 4.14424234 | 1.65769694 | 0.82884847 | 0.01036061 |
| 5 | 21.70621064 | 10.85310532 | 5.42655266 | 2.17062106 | 1.08531053 | 0.01356638 |
| 6 | 26.99252112 | 13.49626056 | 6.74813028 | 2.69925211 | 1.34962606 | 0.01687033 |
| 7 | 32.40618263 | 16.20309132 | 8.10154566 | 3.24061826 | 1.62030913 | 0.02025386 |
| 8 | 37.92665854 | 18.96332927 | 9.48166464 | 3.79266585 | 1.89633293 | 0.02370416 |
| 9 | 43.53894262 | 21.76947131 | 10.88473566 | 4.35389426 | 2.17694713 | 0.02721184 |
| 10 | 49.23160996 | 24.61580498 | 12.30790249 | 4.92316100 | 2.46158050 | 0.03076976 |
| 11 | 54.99568366 | 27.49784183 | 13.74892092 | 5.49956837 | 2.74978418 | 0.03437230 |
| 12 | 60.82393197 | 30.41196599 | 15.20598299 | 6.08239320 | 3.04119660 | 0.03801496 |
| 13 | 66.71040964 | 33.35520482 | 16.67760241 | 6.67104096 | 3.33552048 | 0.04169401 |
| 14 | 72.54749176 | 36.27374588 | 18.13687294 | 7.25474918 | 3.62737459 | 0.04534218 |
| 15 | 78.53358713 | 39.26679356 | 19.63339678 | 7.85335871 | 3.92667936 | 0.04908349 |
| 16 | 84.37732944 | 42.18866472 | 21.09433236 | 8.43773294 | 4.21886647 | 0.05273583 |
| 17 | 90.38970654 | 45.19485327 | 22.59742663 | 9.03897065 | 4.51948533 | 0.05649357 |
| 18 | 96.43846417 | 48.21923208 | 24.10961604 | 9.64384642 | 4.82192321 | 0.06027404 |
| 19 | 102.52139796 | 51.26069898 | 25.63034949 | 10.25213980 | 5.12606990 | 0.06407587 |
| 20 | 108.63654723 | 54.31827361 | 27.15913681 | 10.86365472 | 5.43182736 | 0.06789784 |
| 21 | 114.78215713 | 57.39107857 | 28.69553928 | 11.47821571 | 5.73910786 | 0.07173885 |
| 22 | 120.95664825 | 60.47832412 | 30.23916206 | 12.09566482 | 6.04783241 | 0.07559791 |
| 23 | 127.15859182 | 63.57929591 | 31.78964795 | 12.71585918 | 6.35792959 | 0.07947412 |
| 24 | 133.38668940 | 66.69334470 | 33.34667235 | 13.33866894 | 6.66933447 | 0.08336668 |
| 25 | 139.63975607 | 69.81987804 | 34.90993902 | 13.96397561 | 6.98198780 | 0.08727485 |
Sybil attacks from enemies within
Assume a sybil attack is ongoing right now and that the counterparties with the most valuable fidelity bonds are actually controlled by the same entity. Then, what is the probability of a successful sybil attack for a given makercount, and what is the fidelity bond value being foregone by not putting all bitcoins into just one maker.
| Maker count | Success probability | Foregone value / BTC1.3 |
|---|
| 1 | 54.00037% | 0.0000000000000000 |
| 2 | 41.11477% | 0.0000001148990555 |
| 3 | 19.7607% | 0.0000002165074345 |
| 4 | 14.6452% | 0.0000003296474357 |
| 5 | 18.78554% | 0.0000004568214706 |
| 6 | 28.28682% | 0.0000005755373855 |
| 7 | 42.93944% | 0.0000006760191797 |
| 8 | 32.11612% | 0.0000007337663387 |
| 9 | 25.66605% | 0.0000007794003638 |
| 10 | 29.94767% | 0.0000008204251965 |