Resistance to Sybil Attacks from Fidelity Bonds

Sybil attacks from external enemies.

Assuming the makers in the offerbook right now are not sybil attackers, how much would a sybil attacker starting now have to sacrifice to succeed in their attack with 95% probability. Honest weight=0.0000197610870282 BTC1.3
Also assumes that takers are not price-sensitive and that their max coinjoin fee is configured high enough that they dont exclude any makers.
Maker count6month locked coins / BTC1y locked coins / BTC2y locked coins / BTC5y locked coins / BTC10y locked coins / BTCRequired burned coins / BTC
131.1757807315.587890377.793945183.117578071.558789040.01948486
276.3790275138.1895137619.094756887.637902753.818951380.04773689
3126.9061244663.4530622331.7265311212.690612456.345306220.07931633
4180.5550116190.2775058045.1387529018.055501169.027750580.11284688
5236.42229325118.2111466259.1055733123.6422293211.821114660.14776393
6294.00036009147.0001800573.5000900229.4000360114.700018000.18375023
7352.96552403176.4827620188.2413810135.2965524017.648276200.22060345
8413.09410178206.54705089103.2735254541.3094101820.654705090.25818381
9474.22264670237.11132335118.5556616847.4222646723.711132340.29638915
10536.22671957268.11335979134.0566798953.6226719626.811335980.33514170
11599.00854484299.50427242149.7521362159.9008544829.950427240.37438034
12662.48935468331.24467734165.6223386766.2489354733.124467730.41405585
13726.60439407363.30219703181.6510985272.6604394136.330219700.45412775
14790.18142106395.09071053197.5453552679.0181421139.509071050.49386339
15855.38148836427.69074418213.8453720985.5381488442.769074420.53461343
16919.03105763459.51552881229.7577644191.9031057645.951552880.57439441
17984.51738346492.25869173246.1293458698.4517383549.225869170.61532336
181050.39996302525.19998151262.59999076105.0399963052.519998150.65649998
191116.65478660558.32739330279.16369665111.6654786655.832739330.69790924
201183.26049855591.63024927295.81512464118.3260498559.163024930.73953781
211250.19798530625.09899265312.54949633125.0197985362.509899270.78137374
221317.45004388658.72502194329.36251097131.7450043965.872502190.82340628
231385.00111232692.50055616346.25027808138.5001112369.250055620.86562570
241452.83704826726.41852413363.20926207145.2837048372.641852410.90802316
251520.94494539760.47247270380.23623635152.0944945476.047247270.95059059

Sybil attacks from enemies within

Assume a sybil attack is ongoing right now and that the counterparties with the most valuable fidelity bonds are actually controlled by the same entity. Then, what is the probability of a successful sybil attack for a given makercount, and what is the fidelity bond value being foregone by not putting all bitcoins into just one maker.
Maker countSuccess probabilityForegone value / BTC1.3
127.29361%0.0000000000000000
212.35235%0.0000086354430877
38.64636%0.0000227590461985
48.30991%0.0000407483069279
54.50549%0.0000554198269220
63.04182%0.0000711130761019
72.6168%0.0000878075544827
82.38041%0.0001040846955184
92.61193%0.0001205849460027
103.59547%0.0001373333657941