Resistance to Sybil Attacks from Fidelity Bonds

Sybil attacks from external enemies.

Assuming the makers in the offerbook right now are not sybil attackers, how much would a sybil attacker starting now have to sacrifice to succeed in their attack with 95% probability. Honest weight=5.8728704203433999 BTC²
Also assumes that takers are not price-sensitive and that their max coinjoin fee is configured high enough that they dont exclude any makers.
Maker count6month locked coins / BTC1y locked coins / BTC2y locked coins / BTC5y locked coins / BTC10y locked coins / BTCRequired burned coins / BTC
116995.624694448497.812347224248.906173611699.56246944849.7812347210.62226543
241638.3890182120819.1945091110409.597254554163.838901822081.9194509126.02399314
369183.4755048634591.7377524317295.868876226918.347550493459.1737752443.23967219
498430.4207202849215.2103601424607.605180079843.042072034921.5210360161.51901295
5128886.7342154764443.3671077432221.6835538712888.673421556444.3367107780.55420888
6160275.6903736380137.8451868240068.9225934116027.569037368013.78451868100.17230648
7192420.8290921096210.4145460548105.2072730219242.082909219621.04145460120.26301818
8225200.20836688112600.1041834456300.0520917222520.0208366911260.01041834140.75013023
9258524.72448629129262.3622431464631.1811215725852.4724486312926.23622431161.57795280
10292326.53881588146163.2694079473081.6347039729232.6538815914616.32694079182.70408676
11326552.34855377163276.1742768881638.0871384432655.2348553816327.61742769204.09521785
12361159.21305175180579.6065258790289.8032629436115.9213051718057.96065259225.72450816
13396111.83078836198055.9153941899027.9576970939611.1830788419805.59153942247.56989424
14430771.14851607215385.57425804107692.7871290243077.1148516121538.55742580269.23196782
15466315.27436844233157.63718422116578.8185921146631.5274368423315.76371842291.44704648
16501014.13886225250507.06943112125253.5347155650101.4138862225050.70694311313.13383679
17536714.31990654268357.15995327134178.5799766353671.4319906526835.71599533335.44644994
18572630.52055439286315.26027719143157.6301386057263.0520554428631.52602772357.89407535
19608749.65178775304374.82589387152187.4129469460874.9651787730437.48258939380.46853237
20645060.07148531322530.03574265161265.0178713364506.0071485332253.00357427403.16254468
21681551.35978925340775.67989463170387.8399473168155.1359789334077.56798946425.96959987
22718214.13841261359107.06920631179553.5346031571821.4138412635910.70692063448.88383651
23755039.92368187377519.96184093188759.9809204775503.9923681937751.99618409471.89995230
24792021.00582079396010.50291040198005.2514552079202.1005820839601.05029104495.01312864
25829150.34888951414575.17444476207287.5872223882915.0348889541457.51744448518.21896806

Sybil attacks from enemies within

Assume a sybil attack is ongoing right now and that the counterparties with the most valuable fidelity bonds are actually controlled by the same entity. Then, what is the probability of a successful sybil attack for a given makercount, and what is the fidelity bond value being foregone by not putting all bitcoins into just one maker.
Maker countSuccess probabilityForegone value / BTC²
153.51744%0.0000000000000000
222.03344%3.0377233120530303
311.76092%6.7236749084096710
49.68951%11.1117973884219872
510.57545%15.8262732587970376
617.84987%20.9958910569675439
730.56684%25.6889457466052846
881.64563%30.3411123644063032
928.55192%31.3129783671397810
1020.47553%32.2378860611565798