Resistance to Sybil Attacks from Fidelity Bonds
Sybil attacks from external enemies.
Assuming the makers in the offerbook right now are not sybil attackers, how much would a sybil attacker starting now have to sacrifice to succeed in their attack with 95% probability. Honest weight=0.0000000000000000 BTC
1.3Also assumes that takers are not price-sensitive and that their max coinjoin fee is configured high enough that they dont exclude any makers.
| Maker count | 6month locked coins / BTC | 1y locked coins / BTC | 2y locked coins / BTC | 5y locked coins / BTC | 10y locked coins / BTC | Required burned coins / BTC |
|---|
| 1 | 0.00000000 | 0.00000000 | 0.00000000 | 0.00000000 | 0.00000000 | 0.00000000 |
| 2 | 0.00000000 | 0.00000000 | 0.00000000 | 0.00000000 | 0.00000000 | 0.00000000 |
| 3 | 0.00000000 | 0.00000000 | 0.00000000 | 0.00000000 | 0.00000000 | 0.00000000 |
| 4 | 0.00000000 | 0.00000000 | 0.00000000 | 0.00000000 | 0.00000000 | 0.00000000 |
| 5 | 0.00000000 | 0.00000000 | 0.00000000 | 0.00000000 | 0.00000000 | 0.00000000 |
| 6 | 0.00000000 | 0.00000000 | 0.00000000 | 0.00000000 | 0.00000000 | 0.00000000 |
| 7 | 0.00000000 | 0.00000000 | 0.00000000 | 0.00000000 | 0.00000000 | 0.00000000 |
| 8 | 0.00000000 | 0.00000000 | 0.00000000 | 0.00000000 | 0.00000000 | 0.00000000 |
| 9 | 0.00000000 | 0.00000000 | 0.00000000 | 0.00000000 | 0.00000000 | 0.00000000 |
| 10 | 0.00000000 | 0.00000000 | 0.00000000 | 0.00000000 | 0.00000000 | 0.00000000 |
| 11 | 0.00000000 | 0.00000000 | 0.00000000 | 0.00000000 | 0.00000000 | 0.00000000 |
| 12 | 0.00000000 | 0.00000000 | 0.00000000 | 0.00000000 | 0.00000000 | 0.00000000 |
| 13 | 0.00000000 | 0.00000000 | 0.00000000 | 0.00000000 | 0.00000000 | 0.00000000 |
| 14 | 0.00000000 | 0.00000000 | 0.00000000 | 0.00000000 | 0.00000000 | 0.00000000 |
| 15 | 0.00000000 | 0.00000000 | 0.00000000 | 0.00000000 | 0.00000000 | 0.00000000 |
| 16 | 0.00000000 | 0.00000000 | 0.00000000 | 0.00000000 | 0.00000000 | 0.00000000 |
| 17 | 0.00000000 | 0.00000000 | 0.00000000 | 0.00000000 | 0.00000000 | 0.00000000 |
| 18 | 0.00000000 | 0.00000000 | 0.00000000 | 0.00000000 | 0.00000000 | 0.00000000 |
| 19 | 0.00000000 | 0.00000000 | 0.00000000 | 0.00000000 | 0.00000000 | 0.00000000 |
| 20 | 0.00000000 | 0.00000000 | 0.00000000 | 0.00000000 | 0.00000000 | 0.00000000 |
| 21 | 0.00000000 | 0.00000000 | 0.00000000 | 0.00000000 | 0.00000000 | 0.00000000 |
| 22 | 0.00000000 | 0.00000000 | 0.00000000 | 0.00000000 | 0.00000000 | 0.00000000 |
| 23 | 0.00000000 | 0.00000000 | 0.00000000 | 0.00000000 | 0.00000000 | 0.00000000 |
| 24 | 0.00000000 | 0.00000000 | 0.00000000 | 0.00000000 | 0.00000000 | 0.00000000 |
| 25 | 0.00000000 | 0.00000000 | 0.00000000 | 0.00000000 | 0.00000000 | 0.00000000 |
Sybil attacks from enemies within
Assume a sybil attack is ongoing right now and that the counterparties with the most valuable fidelity bonds are actually controlled by the same entity. Then, what is the probability of a successful sybil attack for a given makercount, and what is the fidelity bond value being foregone by not putting all bitcoins into just one maker.
| Maker count | Success probability | Foregone value / BTC1.3 |
|---|
| 1 | 0.0% | 0.0000000000000000 |
| 2 | 0.0% | 0.0000000000000000 |
| 3 | 0.0% | 0.0000000000000000 |
| 4 | 0.0% | 0.0000000000000000 |
| 5 | 0.0% | 0.0000000000000000 |
| 6 | 0.0% | 0.0000000000000000 |
| 7 | 0.0% | 0.0000000000000000 |
| 8 | 0.0% | 0.0000000000000000 |
| 9 | 0.0% | 0.0000000000000000 |
| 10 | 0.0% | 0.0000000000000000 |