Resistance to Sybil Attacks from Fidelity Bonds
Sybil attacks from external enemies.
Assuming the makers in the offerbook right now are not sybil attackers, how much would a sybil attacker starting now have to sacrifice to succeed in their attack with 95% probability. Honest weight=0.0000097945854734 BTC
1.3Also assumes that takers are not price-sensitive and that their max coinjoin fee is configured high enough that they dont exclude any makers.
Maker count | 6month locked coins / BTC | 1y locked coins / BTC | 2y locked coins / BTC | 5y locked coins / BTC | 10y locked coins / BTC | Required burned coins / BTC |
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1 | 21.94850546 | 10.97425273 | 5.48712636 | 2.19485055 | 1.09742527 | 0.01371782 |
2 | 53.77268710 | 26.88634355 | 13.44317177 | 5.37726871 | 2.68863435 | 0.03360793 |
3 | 89.34498832 | 44.67249416 | 22.33624708 | 8.93449883 | 4.46724942 | 0.05584062 |
4 | 127.11510553 | 63.55755277 | 31.77877638 | 12.71151055 | 6.35575528 | 0.07944694 |
5 | 166.44702625 | 83.22351312 | 41.61175656 | 16.64470262 | 8.32235131 | 0.10402939 |
6 | 206.98338122 | 103.49169061 | 51.74584531 | 20.69833812 | 10.34916906 | 0.12936461 |
7 | 248.49628618 | 124.24814309 | 62.12407155 | 24.84962862 | 12.42481431 | 0.15531018 |
8 | 290.82826267 | 145.41413134 | 72.70706567 | 29.08282627 | 14.54141313 | 0.18176766 |
9 | 333.86424029 | 166.93212015 | 83.46606007 | 33.38642403 | 16.69321201 | 0.20866515 |
10 | 377.51661081 | 188.75830541 | 94.37915270 | 37.75166108 | 18.87583054 | 0.23594788 |
11 | 421.71653788 | 210.85826894 | 105.42913447 | 42.17165379 | 21.08582689 | 0.26357284 |
12 | 466.40856703 | 233.20428352 | 116.60214176 | 46.64085670 | 23.32042835 | 0.29150535 |
13 | 511.54710916 | 255.77355458 | 127.88677729 | 51.15471092 | 25.57735546 | 0.31971694 |
14 | 556.30687752 | 278.15343876 | 139.07671938 | 55.63068775 | 27.81534388 | 0.34769180 |
15 | 602.20930560 | 301.10465280 | 150.55232640 | 60.22093056 | 30.11046528 | 0.37638082 |
16 | 647.02014548 | 323.51007274 | 161.75503637 | 64.70201455 | 32.35100727 | 0.40438759 |
17 | 693.12410651 | 346.56205325 | 173.28102663 | 69.31241065 | 34.65620533 | 0.43320257 |
18 | 739.50703978 | 369.75351989 | 184.87675994 | 73.95070398 | 36.97535199 | 0.46219190 |
19 | 786.15204185 | 393.07602092 | 196.53801046 | 78.61520418 | 39.30760209 | 0.49134503 |
20 | 833.04407785 | 416.52203892 | 208.26101946 | 83.30440778 | 41.65220389 | 0.52065255 |
21 | 880.16969135 | 440.08484567 | 220.04242284 | 88.01696913 | 44.00848457 | 0.55010606 |
22 | 927.51677104 | 463.75838552 | 231.87919276 | 92.75167710 | 46.37583855 | 0.57969798 |
23 | 975.07436092 | 487.53718046 | 243.76859023 | 97.50743609 | 48.75371805 | 0.60942148 |
24 | 1022.83250444 | 511.41625222 | 255.70812611 | 102.28325044 | 51.14162522 | 0.63927032 |
25 | 1070.78211522 | 535.39105761 | 267.69552880 | 107.07821152 | 53.53910576 | 0.66923882 |
Sybil attacks from enemies within
Assume a sybil attack is ongoing right now and that the counterparties with the most valuable fidelity bonds are actually controlled by the same entity. Then, what is the probability of a successful sybil attack for a given makercount, and what is the fidelity bond value being foregone by not putting all bitcoins into just one maker.
Maker count | Success probability | Foregone value / BTC1.3 |
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1 | 76.0038% | 0.0000000000000000 |
2 | 51.79977% | 0.0000061157732541 |
3 | 33.85001% | 0.0000112329236353 |
4 | 31.63321% | 0.0000161180882527 |
5 | 24.50115% | 0.0000197637414291 |
6 | 26.88864% | 0.0000231998894281 |
7 | 25.75131% | 0.0000258026843624 |
8 | 38.87074% | 0.0000282897045634 |
9 | 45.4724% | 0.0000299789796312 |
10 | 20.8998% | 0.0000307723626382 |